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Abkhazia’s ‘creeping’ incorporation  
The end of the experiment of a separatist democracy
Wojciech Górecki
On 5 March 2015 a Russian-Abkhazian treaty on alliance and strategic partnership came into 
effect; it had been signed on 24 November 2014. In fact, the treaty provides a “roadmap” 
for the incorporation of Abkhazia into the Russian area of defence and economic and social 
affairs: as soon as the transition periods defined in the treaty expire, Russian standards and 
legal regulations will be rolled out in these areas. Despite maintaining the formal status of the 
Abkhazian government institutions and attributes of statehood (which, however, is a fact of 
minor importance, as Abkhazia is not internationally recognised as a state), the treaty’s entry 
into force will de facto bring the current model of functioning of this para-state to an end.
On the one hand, the treaty offers the formalisation of Russia’s influence in Abkhazia, for in-
stance by providing for the creation of a common Russian-Abkhazian security space, which has 
actually already been in place for several years. On the other hand, however, the treaty is tan-
tamount to another case – after Crimea – of an actual expansion of Russia’s borders at the cost 
of a neighbouring country. This time, though, it is not being done by way of annexation, but 
by transforming the Moscow-controlled separatist republic into a specific kind of ‘associated 
territory’ (a similar scenario, involving the signing of a treaty leading to very deep integration, is 
currently being implemented by Moscow towards South Ossetia). In the new situation, finding 
a resolution to the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict seems to be even less likely than before. 
The launch of the process of a ‘creeping’ incorporation of Abkhazia has not met with resistance 
from local elites or Abkhazian society. The difficult living conditions and the fact that the re-
public has had an unclear status for over twenty years have resulted in political independence 
seeming to have lost its importance as a top value for both the elites and for society at large.
A brief history of the para-state
Abkhazia’s current political model was formed 
after the Abkhazian-Georgian war (1992–1993) 
and after Tbilisi’s loss of control over the pro-
vince. Regardless of the lack of international 
recognition of Abkhazia as a legitimate state, 
the model involved the republic’s sovereignty in 
domestic politics based to a large extent on ar-
chaic traditions of tribal democracy (with veches 
– traditional assemblies – as the ultimate mani-
festation of the ‘people’s will’) and on a certain 
margin of independence from Moscow. Russia 
guaranteed Abkhazia ‘protection’ from Georgia 
and was their ‘window on the world’ (the Abk-
hazians were allowed to travel practically only to 
Russia – originally on a limited scale, and if they 
intended to travel outside Russia, they were ob-
liged to use Russian passports). The republic or-
ganised its own free elections (with a real politi-
cal contest), freedom of speech was respected. 
An independent and opposition-related media 
operated in Abkhazia. Sukhumi was a participant 
in the peace process: Abkhazian delegations 
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took part in international meetings in various 
formats, and during the first term in office of 
President Sergei Bagapsh (2005–2010) informal 
bilateral talks were conducted with Georgian. 
The UN observer mission (UNOMIG) maintained 
an office in the Abkhazian para-state.
Regardless of external circumstances, the cre-
ation of such a model of functioning was pos-
sible due to the strength and determination of 
Abkhazia’s ruling elite; although this was Rus-
sia-oriented, it was consistent in its efforts to 
build the state structures (with the support from 
a large portion of the Abkhazian population)1. 
The ruling elite stemmed mainly from the aca-
demic community and was gradually formed ac-
cording to criteria reaching beyond the criterion 
of ethnicity – apart from Abkhazians, the first 
separatist leadership included two Greeks, two 
Armenians, one Georgian and one Russian.
The situation changed after the Russian-Geo-
rgian war, and especially after Moscow reco-
gnised Abkhazia’s independence (on 26 August 
2008). On the one hand, this move considera-
bly reduced Sukhumi’s room for manoeuvre 
since foreign partners, unwilling to legitimise 
Moscow’s decisions and to challenge Georgia’s 
territorial integrity, decided to discontinue their 
relations with the para-state. Moreover, the UN 
observer mission was withdrawn from Abkhazia 
under pressure from the Kremlin. On the other 
hand, Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia’s inde-
pendence resulted in a number of Abkhazian-
-Russian ‘interstate’ agreements being signed. 
This in fact increased the republic’s dependence 
on Russia (the establishment of a Russian mili-
tary base, the protection of Abkhazia’s exter-
nal borders by the Russian FSB). At the same 
time, an evolution of the domestic situation 
1 See Wojciech Górecki, ‘Abchaskie elity wobec niepod-
ległości’, Studia i Materiały no. 103, Polski Instytut 
Spraw Międzynarodowych [The Polish Institute of Inter-
national Affairs], Warsaw 1996. It is important to bear 
in mind the change in Abkhazia’s ethnic composition – 
originally (after the war of 1992-1993), the republic was 
abandoned by nearly all ethnic Georgians (some of them 
returned to Abkhazia afterwards).
in Abkhazia could be observed. Permanent cri-
sis and widespread corruption contributed to 
aggravate and frustrate society and resulted, 
for example, in growing migration trends, with 
Russia as the main destination (in practice, any-
one interested could obtain a Russian passport). 
The position of the Abkhazian elite diminished 
gradually as it lost the last semblances of its in-
dependence only to become a collective client 
of Moscow, almost completely dependent on 
subsidies granted from the Russian state bud-
get. To legitimise its actions, the elite began 
increasingly to reach for nationalist rhetoric.
As a result of the above-mentioned evolution, 
presidential elections organised on 24 August 
2014 ended in victory for Raul Khajimba, con-
sidered the most pro-Russian of all Abkhazian 
politicians (the circumstances surrounding the 
elections will be discussed further on in the 
text). Already ten years previously Khajimba 
had been calling for multi-level relations with 
the Russian Federation to be bolstered. Howe-
ver, this failed to bring him any success at the 
time, nor did it in the following two elections. 
In the new situation the same slogans granted 
him victory at the polls.
The Russian-Abkhazian treaty
Only two days after winning the elections, 
Khajimba stated that Abkhazia would not be-
come part of the Russian Federation; quite the 
opposite – Moscow would help Abkhazia deve-
lop its statehood2. On the one hand, this anno-
2 Хаджимба: Абхазия не будет входить в состав 
России, Kavkaz-uzel.ru, 26 August 2014, http://www.
kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/248120.
Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia’s in-
dependence (on 26 August 2008) has 
considerably reduced Sukhumi’s room for 
manoeuvre.
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uncement was probably intended to appease 
the Abkhazians, who still cherished the idea of 
independence, and on the other hand it was me-
ant to prepare society for the treaty with Russia 
which in fact considerably reduced Abkhazia’s 
‘statehood’ (despite Moscow’s declared readi-
ness to take all necessary measures and efforts to 
foster international recognition of the republic).
The Russian side expressed its willingness to sign 
the treaty to strengthen bilateral relations alrea-
dy in August. In mid-October a draft document 
prepared by Russia (entitled “On cooperation 
and integration”) was submitted to Abkhazia’s 
parliament. In line with Khajimba’s announce-
ment that the document required more detailed 
work, the Abkhazian side introduced a number 
of amendments to it (including the change of the 
title), most of which were approved for inclusion 
in the final version of the text. As it seems, both 
the process of making amendments and public 
consultations were intended to prevent the risk 
of possible protests and to create the impression 
that both sides have an equal, partner-like sta-
tus in relations between Moscow and Sukhumi3. 
The most significant amendment introduced by 
the Abkhazian side – and approved by Russia 
– involved the removal of the provision concer-
ning the simplification of procedures of granting 
citizenship of one of the countries to citizens 
of the other (which would have made it easier 
3 The original text prepared by the Russian side and the 
version of the treaty proposed by Abkhazia are available 
at: http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/251796 (Договор 
о союзничестве между Россией и Абхазией. Поправки 
абхазской стороны, Kavkaz-uzel.ru, 5 November 2014).
for Russians to purchase attractive real estate 
in Abkhazia – currently, individuals who do not 
hold Abkhazian citizenship are not allowed to 
buy real estate in Abkhazia). As a consequence, 
an asymmetrical provision was included in the 
text of the treaty according to which the Russian 
Federation will take additional measures to sim-
plify the procedures allowing Russian citizenship 
to be granted to citizens of Abkhazia (Article 13)4.
The treaty’s final title was “On Alliance and 
Strategic Partnership”, and it was signed by 
Vladimir Putin and Raul Khajimba in Sochi on 
24 November 2014. The most significant pro-
visions providing for a gradual, de facto incor-
poration of Abkhazia into Russia, are contained 
in Article 3 which mentions the main directions 
of the alliance and strategic partnership. The-
se include: the pursuit of a coordinated fore-
ign policy5, the creation of a common defence 
and security space, building a common social 
and economic sphere and maintaining cultural, 
spiritual and interpersonal bonds. The treaty 
also provides for the creation of a united gro-
uping of troops composed of Abkhazian and 
Russian units within a year of the treaty’s co-
ming into effect. These troops will be headed 
by a commander appointed by the Russian side 
in case of a threat of armed aggression and 
in wartime (the composition of this grouping 
of troops, the method of its forming, functio-
ning, use and supply, as well as its command 
strategy are to be regulated in a separate 
agreement to be made within six months from 
the day on which the treaty comes into effect6, 
Articles 5 and 7). Within three years, a Russian-
4 The final wording of the treaty is available at: http://
www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/252910 (Договор между 
Российской Федерацией и Республикой Абхазия 
о союзничестве и стратегическом партнерстве, 
Kavkaz-uzel.ru, 24 November 2014).
5 Ibid. In the original Russian version, the word “agreed” 
was used in place of “coordinated”.
6 Ibid. The deadline specified in the original Russian ver-
sion was three months. Furthermore, the two original 
versions included the possibility of professional military 
service of Abkhaz citizens in Russian units stationed 
in the republic. However, in the final edited version of 
the treaty, this provision has been deleted.
The Russian-Abkhazian treaty provides 
for pursuit of coordinated foreign policy, 
creation of common defence and security 
space, formation of common social and 
economic area and maintaining of cultur-
al, spiritual and interpersonal bonds.
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-financed modernisation of the Abkhazian mili-
tary is to take place which will include a gradual 
unification of military standards (Article 8) and, 
within two years, the process of securing the 
Abkhazian-Russian border and the para-state’s 
maritime border is to be completed (with full 
freedom of crossing the border with Russia to 
be maintained, Article 9). Within a year after 
the treaty comes into effect, a Joint Informa-
tion and Coordination Centre of internal affairs 
institutions is to be established, and its main 
tasks will involve exchanging information and 
creating a database on organised crime groups 
(Article 10).
Abkhazia committed itself to adapt its cu-
stoms legislation to standards applicable in the 
Eurasian Economic Union (the Eurasian Union) 
within three years, and to apply Russian regu-
lations in those areas which are not covered by 
these standards. Similarly, within three years, 
Abkhazia is expected to adjust its budget legisla-
tion to Russian standards (Article 11). A further 
harmonisation of the Abkhazian legislative sys-
tem with the Russian one is to cover such areas 
as: social policy, healthcare and education. The 
treaty also mentions a gradual rise in the wages 
of Abkhazian public sector workers to reach the 
Russian Federation’s Southern Federal District 
level. The wage increase is to be co-financed by 
the Russian side according to a schedule set in 
a separate agreement which is to be signed 
within three months after the treaty comes into 
effect (Article 14)7.
The ‘Sukhumi Maidan’ and the presiden-
tial elections 
Abkhazia’s adoption and signing of a treaty 
which radically reduces its ‘sovereignty’ is clo-
sely related to Raul Khajimba’s rise to power. 
During the last two decades, Khajimba, a gra-
duate of a KGB college in Minsk, has held se-
7 Ibid. The treaty also mentions salary rises for Abkhaz mili-
tary professionals and officers of the ministry of the interior.
veral posts: of a local KGB head, minister of 
defence, deputy prime minister, prime minister 
and vice-president of the separatist Abkhazia. 
He ran for the presidency in the elections or-
ganised on 11 October 2004, losing, however, 
to Sergei Bagapsh8; in 2009 he lost to Bagapsh 
again, and in 2011 he lost to Alexander Ankvab.
After his most recent electoral failure, Khajim-
ba became a member of parliament and an 
opposition leader, and focused on voicing he-
avy criticism of the government. His political 
base included activists of one of the two or-
ganisations grouping veterans who fought in 
the war with Georgia – the ‘Aruaa’ organisation 
(‘Defenders of the Fatherland’); he used their 
support to organise large-scale street demon-
strations. The largest such demonstration took 
place on 27 May 2014: the scale of the protest 
(approximate estimates put the number of par-
ticipants at 5,000 15,000) and the presented 
radical demands, including the resignation of 
Ankvab and other top officials from their posts, 
have led to these events being referred to in the 
media as the ‘Sukhumi Maidan’.
The demonstrations culminated in the presi-
dent’s office being taken by force (the angry 
crowd stormed the building when Ankvab, who 
had already launched talks with Khajimba, de-
8 Khajimba refused to accept the election results and urged 
his supporters take to the streets. This, in turn, sparked 
a serious crisis in the republic that resulted in a repeat elec-
tion in which Bagapsh ran with Khajimba as his candidate 
for the office of vice-president (in Abkhazia’s presidential 
elections the candidates run in pairs). In the election on 
12 January 2005 the Bagapsh-Khajimba tandem won 90.1% 
of the votes. As vice-president, Khajimba sabotaged the 
draft law submitted by Bagapsh which was intended to 
enable Georgians to obtain Abkhaz citizenship (Georgians 
account for approximately 20% of Abkhazia’s population).
Abkhazia’s adoption and signing of the 
treaty seems to be closely related to the 
rise to power of Raul Khajimba – a gradu-
ate of a KGB college in Minsk.
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cided not to go out to address the protesters). 
Fearing for his security, he hid in the Russian 
military base in Gudauta and resigned from of-
fice on 1 June 2014. The lack of a decisive re-
action from Moscow, which offered no help to 
Ankvab other than shelter (Ankvab repeatedly 
attempted to call Vladimir Putin, however, to 
no avail) sparked speculation suggesting that 
the opposition’s actions might have been in-
spired by Russia9. The arguments in support of 
this thesis included the Kremlin’s dissatisfaction 
with Ankvab’s policy, which it had assessed 
as being too independent – Ankvab failed to 
transfer to Russia the territory located around 
the Aibga village situated on both banks of the 
river Psou10, which has served as the border be-
tween Abkhazia and Russia. Moreover, he fo-
stered settlement activities of Abkhazians and 
Cherkess living abroad, who – having obtained 
Abkhazian passports – were allowed to travel 
to Russia without restrictions (the Kremlin 
strongly opposed such settlement activities)11.
Regardless of the alleged Russian-inspired ac-
tions, frustration and dissatisfaction could be 
observed in Abkhazia with regard to the dif-
ficult living conditions and the continuously 
9 See for example Игорь Ленский, Муляж абхазской 
демократии, Stopstamp.ru, http://www.stopstamp.ru/
statty/jz3uyp3tiurjy19sks5s.html.
10 In March 2011, still during Sergei Bagapsh’s rule, Russia 
reportedly requested that these territories be returned to 
it. The size of the territories is 160 km2, they are adjacent 
to Krasnaya Polyana and Sochi which were preparing for 
the 2014 Winter Olympics. The matter has not yet been 
resolved to date (18 March 2015).
11 Wojciech Górecki, ‘No change in the Russian Caucasus. 
The Winter Olympics amid a local war’, OSW Studies, 
January 2014, p. 44. 
growing scale of corruption. The blame for 
the unfavourable situation was placed on the 
president, while he himself was accused not 
so much of dishonesty as of incompetence12. 
In this context, some of Khajimba’s supporters 
have claimed that the demonstration organi-
sed on 27 May in fact was a veche, a traditio-
nal gathering of the adult population typical of 
tribal democracies, during which decisions on 
the most important community matters are ta-
ken (proponents of this concept have presented 
an inflated number of the demonstration’s par-
ticipants, i.e. up to 26,000 individuals)13.
After Ankvab’s resignation, the speaker of the 
parliament Valeri Bganba called a snap election 
and then – most probably inspired by Khajimba 
– ordered that a list be made up containing the 
names of individuals who had received Abkha-
zian identity documents despite being Georgian 
citizens (the Abkhazian law bans dual citizen-
ship, with the sole exception being Russian citi-
zenship). As a consequence, the Central Electoral 
Committee deleted over 22,000 names from the 
electoral registers – mainly ethnic Georgians14. 
They were the potential electorate of Khajimba’s 
most serious rival, the head of the State Security 
Service Aslan Bzhania, whose candidature had 
been submitted by Ankvab’s camp.
In the election organised on 24 August 2014 
Khajimba won in the first round with 51.5% of 
the votes (the leader of the ‘Aruaa’ association 
Vitali Gabnia was appointed vice-president). 
Aslan Bzhania got 36.6% of the vote, and the 
remaining two candidates – the minister of de-
fence Mirab Kishmaria and former interior mi-
nister Leonid Dzapshba – garnered 6.52% and 
3.47% respectively. Khajimba owed his success 
12 Interviews conducted by the author in Abkhazia in June 
2013 and August 2014. In Abkhazia Ankvab was ironically 
referred to as Prorab (Russian: Прораб), i.e. a foreman.
13 Wojciech Górecki, ‘Abchazja. Kraj w cudzysłowie’, Rzecz- 
pospolita, 20-21 September 2014.
14 The total number of individuals allowed to vote in the 
elections was 132,861. ЦИК Абхазии исключил из числа 
избирателей более 22 тысяч жителей двух районов, 
Kavkaz-uzel.ru, 18 July 2014, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.
ru/articles/246011/
Khajimba owed his success mainly to the 
lack of distinctive rivals and to the fact that 
some of the voters deliberately chose to 
vote for the most pro-Russian candidate 
hoping that he might become a tool in Mos-
cow’s hands in an attempt to ‘bring order’.
6OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 164
mainly to the lack of clear rivals and to the fact 
that some of the voters deliberately chose to 
vote for the most pro-Russian candidate ho-
ping that he might become a tool in Moscow’s 
hands in an attempt to ‘bring order’ and, most 
importantly, stop the embezzlement of sub-
sidies offered to Abkhazia. Interestingly, the 
two main candidates were from Abjua (eastern 
Abkhazia)15, and all four candidates represen-
ted defence and law enforcement institutions.
Summary and an attempt at a forecast
It can be stated that by signing the treaty with 
Russia, Raul Khajimba fulfilled his pre-election 
promises. According to the treaty’s provisions, 
within the next three years Abkhazia’s integra-
tion with the Russian Federation will proceed 
to reach a level which in practice will mean the 
republic’s real and full incorporation into the 
Russian defence, security, economic and social 
space. At the same time, the Abkhazian govern-
ment institutions are to be formally maintained, 
despite being unrecognised by the internatio-
nal community. This is also how Georgian au-
thorities have interpreted the treaty: Georgia’s 
parliament has considered it to be an attempt 
at Abkhazia’s annexation16, and the Georgian 
Foreign Minister Tamar Beruchashvili said that 
the treaty is a step towards a de facto anne-
xation of Abkhazia by Russia17. The treaty was 
condemned by several Western states and insti-
tutions including the USA, NATO, the European 
Union, and the European Parliament. Protests 
15 Abjua, also referred to as Ochamchira Abkhazia, and Bzy-
pyn (western Abkhazia, the Gudauta District) have been 
involved in a traditional rivalry. Since the beginning of the 
1990s the para-state has been ruled by representatives of 
the two regions interchangeably: Ardzinba represented 
Bzypyn, Bagapsh – Abjua, Ankvab – Bzypyn, Khajimba – 
Abjua (he is a native of the town of Tkvarcheli).
16 Парламент Грузии объявил попыткой аннексии 
Абхазии новый договор республики с Россией, Ka-
vkaz-uzel.ru, 17 October 2014, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.
ru/articles/250927
17 Georgian MFA Condemns New Treaty Between Moscow 
and Sokhumi, Civil.ge, 24 November 2014, http://www.
civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27847
were also staged in Abkhazia itself – approxi-
mately 1,000 people took part in a meeting 
organised by the Amtsakhara party on the day 
the treaty was signed. It is noteworthy, howe-
ver, that a rally organised on the same day in 
support for the government had twice as many 
participants18. In the weeks that followed, no 
similar protests have been organised, which 
suggests that Abkhazian society en masse has 
accepted the treaty (still a decade ago this wo-
uld have been much less likely).
The treaty’s entry into force and the future si-
gning of all agreements scheduled in its provi-
sions would enable Russia to take full control 
over key areas of the functioning of the pa-
ra-state. What is particularly important is the 
announced unification of the two legislative 
systems (which in practice will mean an adjust-
ment of Abkhazian regulations towards Russian 
standards). This is expected to make manage-
ment of the province much easier for Moscow 
in the following areas:
• defence and security, where particular at-
tention can be drawn to the announced uni-
fication of military standards, including in the 
18 Митинги сторонников и противников договора с Россией 
прошли в Сухуме без инцидентов, Kavkaz-uzel.ru, 24 No-
vember 2014, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/252894. 
As can be concluded from later statements by the Amt-
sakhara party activists, the party intended to criticise not just 
the treaty itself (although during a party meeting the party 
members had considered it a “violation of the republic’s sov-
ereignty”); most importantly they intended to criticise Raul 
Khajimba and the para-state’s government for not having 
organised sufficient social consultations when they were 
working on the treaty.
The treaty between Russia and Abkhazia 
has made the prospect of resolving the 
Abkhazian-Georgian conflict ever more 
distant. The same can be said about the 
possible renewal of the dialogue between 
Sukhumi and Tbilisi which was discontin-
ued after the war in 2008.
7OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 164
training sector, which in practice will make the 
Abkhaz military a component of the Russian 
armed forces. This will be further facilitated 
by the fact that Russia would be allowed to 
arbitrarily appoint the commander of the uni-
ted grouping of troops, should it consider that 
a threat of military aggression might be immi-
nent (Moscow might consider that such thre-
at – posed by Georgia – is permanent). So far, 
regardless of the Russian military base and Ab-
khazia’s unquestioned dependence on Russia, 
the Abkhazian military has enjoyed a certain 
independence (demonstrated, for example, by 
the strong position of the president as the head 
of the armed forces; it is noteworthy that the 
two previous presidents had a less servile at-
titude towards Moscow than the current one);
• the economy and social affairs; here the most 
significant change has been the planned adjust-
ment of the Abkhazian budget legislation to Rus-
sian standards and Abkhazia’s adoption of cu-
stoms regulations consistent with the standards 
observed in the Eurasian Union and the Russian 
Federation. This will enable Russia to directly ma-
nage the Abkhazian economy and to influence 
the republic’s domestic affairs to an extent lar-
ger than so far. The adjustment of the Abkhazian 
regulations to Russian standards will include the 
widely understood social sphere (healthcare, edu-
cation, culture etc.), which means Moscow is likely 
to take real control over Abkhazian society and 
to be able to inspire processes which would be 
favourable to Russia (for example by developing 
selected academic subjects at universities, cre-
ating scholarship programmes, funding specific 
initiatives and projects). This is likely to further the 
degradation of the Abkhazian elite and to reduce 
‘all things Abkhazian’ to mere folklore.
The changes discussed above will enable Rus-
sia to de facto expand its territory to include 
Abkhazia without a separate act of annexation 
similar to the one organised in Crimea (it should 
be remembered, however, that Russian ‘border 
guards’ have been stationed on the Abkhazian-
Georgian border and the South Ossetian-Geo-
rgian border since 2009)19. A similar scenario 
is currently being implemented towards South 
Ossetia – information on the preparation of 
a treaty between Russia and South Ossetia was 
shared in November 201420, and in mid-January 
2015 four drafts of the treaty were published 
(the original one prepared by the Russian side 
and three other versions prepared by South 
Ossetia). Based on these documents, represen-
tatives of both sides prepared a common version 
of the text. On 19 February 2015 the text was 
finally approved by the Russian government, 
and on 18 March it was signed by Vladimir Pu-
tin and South Ossetia’s leader Leonid Tibilov 
(the treaty is entitled “On alliance and integra-
tion”)21. Regardless of this treaty, on 18 Febru-
ary 2015 Russia and South Ossetia entered into 
an “Agreement on the state border” (the docu-
ment was signed by the two foreign ministers). 
It is worth noting that after recognising the in-
dependence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
Moscow followed a very similar scenario in its 
actions towards the two para-states, i.e. it si-
gned identical agreements with each of them 
on the same day. This symmetry of actions 
has continued to be evident – on 16 February 
2015, President Putin’s adviser Vladislav Surkov 
said that there should be no border between 
Russia and Abkhazia22. However, the fact that 
19 The tactic of ‘soft conquest’ in which the conquered terri-
tories are allowed to maintain the external attributes of in-
dependence and which involves the adoption of a different 
approach to specific territories, was used by Russia as early 
as in the 19th century. For example the Principality of Ab-
khazia was incorporated into Russia (together with western 
Georgia) in 1810, only to be dissolved in 1864. Until then 
Abkhazia had enjoyed autonomy and had been ruled by its 
own princely clan of Shevarshidze-Chachba.
20 Южная Осетия и Россия разрабатывают новый 
интеграционный договор, Kavkaz-uzel.ru, 20 November 
2014, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/252665. See also 
Maciej Falkowski, ‘Russia’s “Neighbourhood Policy”: the 
case of Abkhazia’, OSW Analyses, 26 November 2014, http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-11-26/rus-
sias-neighbourhood-policy-case-abkhazia.
21 Правительство России одобрило проект договора 
о союзничестве с Южной Осетией. Kavkaz-uzel.ru, 
20.02.2015, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/257636/
22 Владислав Сурков заявил о необходимости снять 
российско-абхазскую границу, Kavkaz-uzel.ru, 17.02.2015, 
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/257396
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an ‘integration’ treaty has been signed with Ab-
khazia first proves that this para-state is playing 
a more prominent role in Russian politics. 
This sequence of events can also be interpreted 
as a demonstration of power (contrary to the 
case of South Ossetia, whose representatives re-
peatedly expressed their willingness to become 
part of Russia, the Abkhazian elite has always 
considered their republic’s independence to be 
a kind of axiom).
The treaty between Russia and Abkhazia has 
made the prospect of resolving the Abkha-
zian-Georgian conflict ever more distant. 
The same can be said about the possible rene-
wal of the dialogue between Sukhumi and Tbili-
si which was discontinued after the war in 2008 
(the only form of bilateral contacts has been the 
so-called ‘Geneva format’ agreed at that time). 
The introduction of the provision on ‘coordi-
nated foreign policy’ is tantamount to the fact 
that such dialogue would have to be approved 
of by Russia. It seems, however, that this would 
only be possible if Tbilisi agreed to make con-
siderable concessions to Moscow, involving for 
example consent to reactivate the railroad run-
ning through Abkhazia which has been out of 
service since the early 1990s (this would make 
it possible to re-open railway connections be-
tween Russia and Armenia). In the long-term 
perspective, another concession of this kind co-
uld involve Georgia joining the Customs Union 
and/or the Eurasian Union. It cannot be ruled 
out that Moscow will at one point attempt to 
convince Tbilisi to take such measures, sugge-
sting that failure to do so may lead to one or 
both of these para-states being annexed.
